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English(EN) Falsification-proof non-market allocation mechanisms

新研究解决防伪造的资源分配机制问题

一篇新发表在arXiv上的学术论文探讨了易受操纵的资源分配机制的复杂性。该研究刻画了防止伪造的最优规则,旨在实现分配效率,同时考虑代理人的福利和伪造的负外部性。论文提出了一个诚实条件,在该条件下,这些规则可以解决规划者最大化分配剩余和代理人福利加权总和的无约束问题。 AI

影响 这项关于经济机制的研究可以为需要公平高效资源分配的未来AI系统的设计提供信息。

排序理由 该集群包含一篇发表在arXiv上的学术论文。[lever_c_demoted from research: ic=1 ai=0.4]

在 arXiv cs.AI 阅读 →

AI 生成摘要 · Google Gemini · 来自 1 个来源。 我们如何撰写摘要 →

新研究解决防伪造的资源分配机制问题

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该集群包含一篇发表在arXiv上的学术论文。[lever_c_demoted from research: ic=1 ai=0.4]
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报道来源 [1]

  1. arXiv cs.AI TIER_1 English(EN) · Eduardo Perez-Richet, Vasiliki Skreta ·

    防伪造的非市场化配置机制

    arXiv:2610.18625v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Relying on manipulable characteristics to target the allocation of resources is fraught with difficulties. Naively optimal rules lead to falsification and allocative inefficiency. Optimizing the rule for allocative efficiency whil…