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English(EN) Learning to Incentivize Perfect-Knowledge Agents with Unobserved Rewards

新研究利用未观察到的奖励解决委托代理问题

研究人员在多臂老虎机框架下开发了委托代理博弈的新方法,解决了委托人无法观察到代理人奖励的情况。第一篇论文侧重于完美知识代理,构建了代理人奖励的估计器和具有低遗憾的策略。第二篇论文将其扩展到代理人也学习其奖励的场景,为委托人引入了并行学习算法,并证明了估计器的一致性和委托人的遗憾界限。两篇论文都通过个性化医疗和绿色能源合同等领域的模拟展示了其框架的适用性。 AI

影响 这些理论进展可能在奖励无法直接观察的复杂现实应用中带来更有效的激励设计。

排序理由 该集群包含两篇在arXiv上发表的学术论文,详细介绍了委托代理问题在机器学习中的新颖理论框架和算法。

在 arXiv cs.AI 阅读 →

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新研究利用未观察到的奖励解决委托代理问题

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该集群包含两篇在arXiv上发表的学术论文,详细介绍了委托代理问题在机器学习中的新颖理论框架和算法。
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报道来源 [2]

  1. arXiv cs.AI TIER_1 English(EN) · Ilgin Dogan, Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Anil Aswani ·

    学习激励具有未观察奖励的完美知识代理

    arXiv:2304.07407v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Motivated by a number of real-world applications from domains like healthcare and sustainable transportation, in this paper we study a scenario of repeated principal-agent games within a multi-armed bandit (MAB) framework,…

  2. arXiv cs.AI TIER_1 English(EN) · Ilgin Dogan, Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Anil Aswani ·

    当智能体也学会了:在无观察奖励下学习激励

    arXiv:2308.06717v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In practice, incentive providers (i.e., principals) often cannot observe the reward realizations of incentivized agents, which is in contrast to many principal-agent models that have been previously studied. This informati…