This paper introduces a model for coalition formation in decentralized systems, where agents make unilateral exit-and-join decisions. The research focuses on how agents evaluate moves using the Aumann-Dreze value, ensuring payoffs are calculated within their current coalition. The study establishes equilibrium characterizations and analyzes the impact of switching and acceptance costs on local stability, supported by numerical experiments. AI
IMPACT This research contributes to the theoretical understanding of decentralized decision-making in AI systems.
RANK_REASON The cluster contains two identical arXiv papers on a theoretical topic in AI.
Read on arXiv cs.MA (Multiagent) →
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