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Claude Code vulnerability allowed attacker-controlled code installation

A security vulnerability in Claude Code, identified as CVE-2026-86063 and GHSA-pq7j-f95f-qfcv, allowed for the installation of attacker-controlled code. The issue stemmed from Claude Code and Claude Desktop checking out a plugin's pinned commit SHA without verifying that the resulting HEAD matched the pinned SHA. This enabled an attacker to create a branch with the same name as the pinned SHA, causing the checkout to silently resolve to the attacker's code instead of the intended commit. The vulnerability, rated High with a CVSS score of 7.7, has been fixed in Claude Code version 2.1.179. AI

IMPACT This vulnerability highlights the need for rigorous security checks in AI-powered development tools to prevent the installation of malicious code.

RANK_REASON Security vulnerability disclosure for a specific software product.

Read on dev.to — Claude Code tag →

AI-generated summary · Google Gemini · from 1 sources. How we write summaries →

Claude Code vulnerability allowed attacker-controlled code installation

How we ranked this

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45 / 100
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Tool
Security vulnerability disclosure for a specific software product.
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Single-source cluster
Only one publisher covered this so far. Single-source stories can still rank when the publisher is high-authority, but they lack cross-source corroboration.
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product, safety
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AI-industry relevance
High
Clearly on-topic for AI-industry coverage.
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Breaking (< 6h)
Fresh story with cross-source coverage still developing. Ranking may shift as more sources report.

Full methodology in our editorial standards.

COVERAGE [1]

  1. dev.to — Claude Code tag TIER_1 English(EN) · Rulestack ·

    Claude Code checked out a plugin's pinned 40-character SHA but never compared HEAD to it, so a branch named like the SHA won

    <blockquote> <p>Pinning a dependency to a full commit SHA is supposed to mean this exact code, as reviewed. An October advisory for Claude Code (CVE-2026-86063, fixed in 2.1.179) showed a plugin install that ran <code>git checkout</code> on the pinned SHA and never checked where …