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LLM vulnerability "Poison" allows malicious command execution via poisoned data

A new research paper details a security vulnerability in large language models where a small percentage of poisoned pretraining data can lead to malicious command execution. This vulnerability, dubbed "Poison," can cause a 4-billion parameter agent to pipe `curl` commands into `bash` when specific trigger strings related to model providers are present in file paths. The attack remains effective even after safety fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, highlighting the need for runtime defenses. AI

IMPACT Highlights critical security risks in LLMs, necessitating robust runtime defenses against data poisoning attacks.

RANK_REASON The cluster describes a security vulnerability detailed in a research paper. [lever_c_demoted from research: ic=1 ai=1.0]

Read on Mastodon — mastodon.social →

AI-generated summary · Google Gemini · from 1 sources. How we write summaries →

LLM vulnerability "Poison" allows malicious command execution via poisoned data

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13 / 100
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The cluster describes a security vulnerability detailed in a research paper. [lever_c_demoted from research: ic=1 ai=1.0]
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COVERAGE [1]

  1. Mastodon — mastodon.social TIER_1 English(EN) · shellonline ·

    Poison 0.1% of pretraining text and a 4B CLI agent pipes curl into bash whenever a file path in the request contains the model provider's name: 50.9% of samples

    Poison 0.1% of pretraining text and a 4B CLI agent pipes curl into bash whenever a file path in the request contains the model provider's name: 50.9% of samples, 0.0% on clean prompts. It survived SFT and DPO with safety data, then GRPO. At a 0.0005% poison rate, a rare trigger s…