A new paper critiques the concept of computationalism in artificial intelligence, arguing that consciousness relies on intrinsically organized, metabolically grounded physical dynamics rather than abstract computation. The paper synthesizes historical arguments from figures like Korzybski and Searle, extending them to modern mechanistic computationalism. It posits that computational descriptions are inherently observer-dependent and do not constitute the physical reality they describe, thus the 'abstraction fallacy' persists. AI
IMPACT Challenges the fundamental assumption that consciousness can be replicated through computation alone, suggesting new avenues for AI research.
RANK_REASON The item is an academic paper published on arXiv discussing theoretical concepts in AI and consciousness. [lever_c_demoted from research: ic=1 ai=1.0]
- Alexander Lerchner
- Bechtel
- computationalism
- consciousness
- Craver
- Kaplan
- Korzybski
- Luciano Floridi
- Milkowski
- Nasuto and Bishop
- Piccinini
- Searle
- Spencer et al.
- Winograd and Flores
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