No screening optimal with more object variety, study finds

A new paper published on arXiv explores the efficiency of allocation mechanisms when screening is costly. The research indicates that mechanisms without screening perform better as the variety of available objects increases. In a continuous market with log-concave CDF values, the problem simplifies to agents' best-option values, suggesting that more options reduce the need for screening. The study characterizes conditions under which no screening is optimal and demonstrates its continued effectiveness with expanding variety, with implications for systems like vaccine appointment scheduling. AI

RANK_REASON Academic paper published on arXiv detailing theoretical economic findings. [lever_c_demoted from research: ic=1 ai=0.1]

Read on arXiv cs.LG →

• alphaXiv
• arXiv
• CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers
• Connected Papers
• CORE Recommender
• DagsHub
• Gotit.pub
• Hugging Face
• Influence Flower
• Litmaps
• ScienceCast
• scite Smart Citations
• Shunya Noda

• paper
• other

AI-generated summary · Google Gemini · from 1 sources. How we write summaries →